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1.  Introduction 
 
There is ample empirical evidence suggesting that banking system concentration affects both the 
efficiency of financial intermediation and the performance of nonfinancial industries. In a recent 
paper, we report that it impacts on labor market performance too (Feldmann 2013). The latter paper 
is the first to study the impact of banking system concentration on the labor market. It uses a sample 
of industrial countries. By contrast, this paper studies the impact on unemployment in developing 
rather than industrial countries.1 The topic is important because many developing countries have been 
experiencing high levels of both bank concentration and unemployment for many years. 
 
The following section reviews previous research, indicating how the effects of bank concentration on 
financial intermediation and the performance of nonfinancial industries might lead to knock-on 
effects on unemployment. Section 3 explains our variable of interest and our control variables. 
Section 4 describes the dependent variable, sample and methodology. Section 5 presents and 
discusses our regression results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Previous research and possible transmission channels 
 
From a theoretical perspective, higher banking system concentration can have either adverse or 
favorable effects on financial intermediation and unemployment. According to the structure-conduct-
performance hypothesis, a higher level of concentration leads to higher loan rates, higher interest 
margins and a restricted supply of loans because of lessened competition and lower costs of collusion 
(e.g., Smith 1998, Guzman 2000). This could reduce investment, economic growth and job creation, 
which is likely to increase unemployment, particularly if wages are sticky downwards. 
 
By contrast, according to the efficient structure hypothesis, a more concentrated banking industry can 
be the result of more efficient banks gaining larger market shares (e.g., Demsetz 1973, Peltzman 
1977). According to this hypothesis, the higher efficiency of financial intermediation has favorable 
knock-on effects on loan rates and firms’ access to finance. In a similar vein, Petersen and Rajan 
(1995) argue that, if credit markets are concentrated, banks have more incentives to forge and 
                                                 
1 Our two papers differ from each other in more respects than country sample. Specifically, the present paper also provides 
a much more comprehensive survey of the previous literature. Furthermore, in its empirical part it reports the results from 
more robustness checks. Finally, it more thoroughly examines possible channels through which bank concentration might 
affect labor market performance. 
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maintain long-term relationships with younger firms. Since they can obtain future surpluses from 
these firms, they initially charge modest loan rates, enabling more firms to be started and financed. 
This in turn can foster job creation, investment and economic growth. Consequently, a more 
concentrated banking industry may result in lower rather than higher unemployment. 
 
Let us now look at previous empirical papers on the effects of bank concentration, starting with those 
studying the effects on the cost of financial intermediation (interest rate margins, bank profitability, 
etc.).2 While most of these papers cover industrial countries, several more recent ones cover 
developing countries. Industrial countries first. Using data from the 1980s on about 4,800 US banks, 
Berger (1995) empirically tests two versions each of the structure-conduct-performance and the 
efficient structure hypotheses. He finds that, while the data lend limited support to one version of 
each hypothesis, none of the four versions are of great importance in explaining bank profits. Using 
US state-level data for the period 1976 to 2000, Jeon and Miller (2005) find that increased bank 
concentration leads (causes) increased bank profitability, supporting the structure-conduct-
performance, rather than the efficient structure, hypothesis. Another study on the US, using quarterly 
bank-level data on 644 banks from 1994 to 2005, also finds a positive and highly significant 
relationship between concentration and profitability (Tregenna 2009). Using UK data over 1996 to 
2002, Hanley et al. (2006) find that lenders with the largest market share in SME finance charged 
significantly higher interest premia, suggesting market power effects. Using a large sample of small 
Norwegian firms from 2000-01, Kim et al. (2012) find a positive and significant effect of banking 
concentration on the mark-ups for older, but not for younger, firms. Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) use 
country-level data on ten EU countries over 1991-99, finding that increased concentration may have 
led to collusion and higher interest margins of banks for both loans and demand deposits, which again 
supports the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis. Using data on 183 banks from the EU-15 
countries for 1997 to 2004, De Jonghe and Vennet (2008) find that banks with a large market share 
in a concentrated market were able to generate non-competitive rents. 
 
Most studies on developing countries also suggest that higher bank concentration increases the cost 
of financial intermediation. For example, using bank-level data Sufian (2011) finds that concentration 
significantly raised banks’ profitability in South Korea over the period 1992 to 2003.3 Using quarterly 
data over 2001 to 2006, Aboagye et al. (2008) find that increases in bank concentration substantially 
increased net interest margins in Ghana. Using monthly data for the Columbian banking system from 
                                                 
2 Our overview of empirical research focuses on more recent studies. For surveys of the older literature, see Berger et al. 
(2004) and OECD (2008). 
3 According to World Bank classification, South Korea was as a developing country up to 2000 (except for 1995-97). 
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1997 to 2006, Tovar et al. (2011) find that high market concentration increased interest rates’ mark-
ups when the system was under stress. Based on quarterly bank-level data from five Latin American 
countries over 1995 to 2001, Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) find that bank concentration raised 
both spreads and administrative costs. Whereas these three studies support the structure-conduct-
performance hypothesis, the following two tend to support the efficient structure hypothesis. First, 
using data on 186 banks from ten central and eastern European countries over the period 1998 to 
2003, Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al. (2009) find that banks in more concentrated markets were more 
efficient provided the degree of competition was sufficiently high. Second, using bank-level data 
from ten Middle East and North African countries, Ben Naceur and Omran (2011) find higher bank 
concentration to have reduced both net interest margins and return on assets over the period 1989 to 
2005. 
 
Two other studies cover both industrial and developing countries. The first of these, which uses bank-
level data for 80 countries in the years 1988-95, finds that bank concentration increased bank 
profitability (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 1999). The second, which uses data on over 1,400 banks 
across 72 countries from the 1995-99 period, finds that while concentration is positively associated 
with net interest margins, this relationship breaks down when controlling for inflation and regulatory 
impediments to competition (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2004). 
 
Thus, while the results are somewhat mixed, most studies suggest that bank concentration raises the 
cost of financial intermediation. As noted previously, this effect could lead to increased 
unemployment by reducing investment and job creation. 
 
The results of empirical papers studying the effect of bank concentration on credit availability are 
more mixed. Interestingly, most papers on industrial countries find a favorable rather than an adverse 
effect. For example, using a large sample of small US firms over 1988-89, Petersen and Rajan (1995) 
find firms in more concentrated credit markets to have somewhat easier access to bank credit. 
Similarly, according to Saeed and Esposito (2012) bank concentration relaxed financial constraints 
on firm-level investment in the UK over 2001-09. Using data on 14 European countries between 1992 
and 2005, Ratti et al. (2008) find that with a highly concentrated banking sector firms were less 
financially constrained. 
 
In contrast to the industrial countries papers, most papers on developing countries find an adverse 
effect on credit availability. For example, de Castro Almeida and Jayme (2008) report that the process 
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of consolidation in the Brazilian banking sector in the period 1995-2004 adversely affected lending, 
mainly in the less developed regions of the country. Similarly, using data on 302 Indian 
manufacturing firms for the period 2000-09, Saeed and Vincent (2012) find that bank concentration 
tightened firms’ financial constraints on investment, the effect being more pronounced for small firms 
and firms dependent on short-term debt. 
 
Three papers use data from both industrial and developing countries. One of them, Olivero et al. 
(2011), which uses bank-level data from 18 Asian and Latin American economies (except for two 
Asian countries all being developing countries), reports that, between 1996 and 2006, the bank 
lending channel of monetary policy was weakened as concentration in banking increased. Another 
one, González and González (2008), uses firm-level data from 39 mostly industrial countries and 
finds that bank market concentration expanded firms’ access to long-term debt in the 1995 to 2004 
period. The third, Beck et al. (2004), uses firm-level data from 74 countries from the late 1990s and 
finds that bank concentration increased financial obstacles, with the effect being the largest for small 
firms. Additionally, it finds that the relationship holds for low-income countries only. 
 
Thus, as far as credit availability is concerned, whereas most studies on industrial countries 
corroborate the efficient structure hypothesis, most studies on developing countries, and most of those 
covering both types of countries, corroborate the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis. Stronger 
(weaker) credit constraints are likely to increase (reduce) unemployment because they adversely 
(favorably) affect investment, probably lowering (increasing) job creation and labor demand. 
 
There is also empirical research on the effects of bank concentration on business formation and 
growth. This research, too, yields mixed results. Take the following three studies on the US. Using 
data from the 1969-76 period, Jackson and Thomas (1995) find that, in general, local bank 
concentration had a positive effect on firm creation. They also find that, whereas bank concentration 
had a positive effect on job growth in new firms, it was negatively associated with job growth in 
mature firms. By contrast, using US state-level data from 1976-94, Black and Strahan (2002) report 
that states with more concentrated local banking markets had lower rates of business incorporation 
and that the introduction of interstate banking increased the rate of incorporations. Similarly, using 
data on nine US regions and 20 manufacturing sectors from 1977-88, Cetorelli (2003) finds that more 
bank concentration implied less entry and lower rates of job creation of younger firms, as well as 
higher job creation rates and delayed exit of older firms. 
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In a paper covering 28 OECD countries, Cetorelli (2004) reports results similar to his US study. 
Specifically, using data on 27 manufacturing sectors from the 1980s and 1990s, he finds that sectors 
where incumbent firms were more dependent on external finance had a disproportionately larger 
average size if they were in countries with a more concentrated banking industry – evidence that 
seems to imply that bank concentration may represent a barrier to entry in non-financial industries. 
Also studying a cross section of OECD countries (with data from 27 industries and the period 1970-
95), Carlin and Mayer (2003) find that higher bank concentration was associated with lower growth 
of equity-financed and skill-intensive industries. 
 
While, in this area, there are no papers yet on developing countries, several papers use data from both 
industrial and developing countries. Using industry-level data for 41 countries over the 1980s and 
1990s, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) show that, while the overall effect on industry growth was 
negative, bank concentration promoted the growth of industries that relied heavily on external finance 
by facilitating credit access to younger firms. By contrast, also using data on 41 industrial and 
developing countries from the 1980s and 1990s, Claessens and Laeven (2005) find no evidence that 
banking system concentration explains industrial sector growth. More in line with Cetorelli and 
Gambera (2001), Fernández et al. (2010), who use data on 84 countries over 1980-2004, report that 
bank concentration generally had a negative effect on economic growth. 
 
All in all, the papers studying the effects on start-up activity and growth neither favor the structure-
conduct-performance hypothesis over the efficient structure hypothesis (or vice versa) nor do they 
lead one to unequivocally expect that higher bank concentration adversely (or favorably) affects 
unemployment through this channel. 
 
Finally, researchers have studied the effects of bank concentration on bank failure and systemic 
banking crises. For example, using a cross-sectional sample of about 2,500 US banks in 2003 and a 
panel dataset of about 2,600 banks in 134 developing countries for 1993-2004, Boyd et al. (2006) 
find that banks’ probability of failure is positively related to concentration. Using bank-level data on 
133 developing countries over the same period, De Nicolò and Loukoianova (2007) find that this 
positive relationship is strongest when state-owned banks have sizeable market shares. By contrast, 
using data on 69 industrial and developing countries from 1980 to 1997, Beck et al. (2006, 2007) find 
that systemic banking crises are less likely in economies with more concentrated banking systems. 
Using data on 79 countries and 50 episodes of banking crises over the same period, Evrensel (2008) 
also finds that bank concentration tends to reduce the risk of bank failure and banking crises. 
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However, she also notes that developing countries have both higher concentration and higher risks of 
bank failure and banking crises. Taken together, the results from this line of research are inconclusive. 
While one can expect more bank failures and banking crises to increase unemployment, previous 
research does not unambiguously suggest that higher concentration is likely to either increase or 
decrease unemployment through this channel. In fact, the results from previous research are 
inconclusive with regards not only to this channel but to all other channels as well. For each of these 
channels it is unclear what to expect from higher concentration – an adverse or a favorable effect on 
unemployment. Thus the issue of how bank concentration affects unemployment needs to be resolved 
empirically. 
 
In our paper studying the effects on labor market performance in industrial countries, we use data on 
21 countries from the period 1987 to 2009 (Feldmann 2013). We find that a more concentrated 
banking sector both increased the unemployment rate and reduced the employment rate over the 
sample period, with the magnitude of both effects being moderate. 
 
 
3.  Variable of interest and control variables 
 
In line with many previous papers, our ‘bank concentration’ variable equals the share of assets of the 
three largest banks in total banking system assets, excluding the central bank (for definitions, 
descriptive statistics and sources of all variables, see Table 1). There is substantial variation in our 
measure, with concentration levels ranging from 0.20 to 1.00, with a sample mean of 0.57 and a 
standard deviation of 0.17. 
 
We use five control variables measuring various characteristics of the financial system. For example, 
we control for the impact of banking system activity using the ‘bank credit’ variable. It measures one 
of the main activities of banks: providing loans. In two of our supplementary regressions, we use a 
measure of the banking sector’s size rather than of its activity: ‘bank deposits’. As bank lending is 
more likely than banking sector size to matter for unemployment and as there is a marked degree of 
correlation between both variables, we prefer ‘bank credit’ to ‘bank deposits’. In one of our robustness 
checks, we add the ‘stock market activity’ variable. The purpose of including these three controls is 
to ensure that our ‘bank concentration’ variable does not proxy for the activity or size of the banking 
industry, or for financial sector development more generally. For example, countries with a larger 
banking industry, relative to the size of the economy, may have a lower bank concentration ratio. 
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For two reasons, we also control for the impact of credit market regulation. First, several theoretical 
and empirical studies suggest that tighter regulation may increase unemployment (e.g., Acemoglu 
2001, Feldmann 2006, 2012a). Second, as the strictness of credit market regulation may affect bank 
concentration levels we need to ensure that ‘bank concentration’ does not proxy for the former. 
 
Furthermore, we control for the impact of systemic banking crises. As the recent global financial 
crises has illustrated, systemic banking crises can substantially raise unemployment. A second reason 
to include this control variable is that, according to previous research, banking system concentration 
may affect the likelihood of such crises (section 2). Thus we need to ensure that ‘bank concentration’ 
does not proxy for systemic banking crises. However, in our sample there is no evidence that any of 
our five financial sector control variables is correlated with ‘bank concentration’. Rather, the 
correlation coefficient between this variable, on the one hand, and each of these five controls, on the 
other, is small in absolute size and statistically insignificant. 
 
We also control for the impact of major labor market institutions. Specifically, we control for 
centralization of collective bargaining, minimum wage, employment protection legislation, 
unemployment benefits, and income and payroll taxes.4 Mainstream labor economics theory suggests 
that more rigid institutions normally increase unemployment. For example, centralized collective 
bargaining is likely to strengthen trade union power, leading to excessive wage hikes and a 
compressed wage structure, both of which in turn raise unemployment (McHugh 2002). In a 
competitive labor market, a higher, binding minimum wage reduces labor demand and increases labor 
supply, also raising unemployment (Boeri and van Ours 2008). Higher labor taxes increase 
unemployment because they raise employers’ wage cost and lower workers’ net wages. More 
generous unemployment benefits raise unemployment by reducing the job-search intensity of the 
unemployed and their willingness to accept job offers. By lowering the economic cost of 
unemployment, they may also put upward pressure on workers’ wage claims, further raising 
unemployment. The effect of stricter employment protection legislation is ambiguous from a 
theoretical point of view because it leads firms to reduce both hiring and dismissal rates (Bertola 
1990). Numerous empirical studies confirm that stricter labor market institutions tend to increase 
                                                 
4 Our tax variable is based on the top marginal income and payroll tax rate and on the income threshold at which the top 
marginal income tax rate applies. The labor tax wedge would have been a preferable indicator. However, data on this 
indicator are available for industrial countries only. Our ‘income and payroll tax rate’ variable can be regarded as a proxy 
for the labor tax wedge because countries with a large (small) tax wedge usually also have a high (low) top marginal 
income and payroll tax rate and a low (high) income threshold at which the top marginal income tax rate applies. Indeed, 
using data from a sample of 21 industrial countries, we find both variables to be highly correlated. 
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unemployment (e.g., Heckman and Pagés 2004, Nickell et al. 2005, Bassanini and Duval 2006, 
Feldmann 2009). 
 
Furthermore, we control for the impact of the real interest rate because a rise in the real interest rate 
reduces investment and labor demand, raising unemployment. Indeed, there is empirical evidence for 
both industrial and developing countries that a higher real interest rate increases unemployment (e.g., 
Fitoussi et al. 2000, Feldmann 2012b). 
 
We also control for the impact of inflation. High inflation rates distort price signals and relative prices, 
hampering an efficient allocation of resources. Furthermore, as profits are mostly taxed on a nominal 
basis, enterprises’ real net return on investment decreases in an inflationary environment so that 
investment and economic growth are likely to decline in the long term. Both effects may lead to 
higher unemployment. Alternatively, if nominal wages are downward rigid, inflation may, upon the 
occurrence of shocks, facilitate the adjustment of real wages, reducing unemployment. Indeed, there 
is evidence for a permanent trade-off between inflation and unemployment at modest inflation rates 
in the United States (Akerlof et al. 1996, 2000, Groshen and Schweitzer 1999) and other industrial 
countries (Wyplosz 2001). Similarly, using data on a large sample of industrial and developing 
countries, Feldmann (2010) finds more inflation to be correlated with less unemployment. 
 
We additionally control for the impact of trade openness. On the one hand, more openness to trade 
may lead to a more efficient international allocation of labor, lowering unemployment (Grossman 
and Rossi-Hansberg 2008, Felbermayr et al. 2011). On the other hand, due to more intense import 
competition, it may increase unemployment, at least during a transition period. 
 
Because unemployment is strongly affected by cyclical conditions, we employ the ‘output gap’ 
variable throughout. For two reasons, we also use ‘GDP per capita’ in all regressions. First, to account 
for the huge differences in economic development and its potential impact on unemployment. Second, 
to ensure that ‘bank concentration’ does not proxy for the level of economic development. The latter 
may be important because the degree of banking system concentration may be systematically linked 
to the level of economic development. However, in our sample, the correlation coefficient between 
both variables is close to nil and statistically insignificant. 
 
We also use a dummy variable for wars because they have a variety of effects on the labor market. 
For example, interstate wars are likely to decrease unemployment because of military draft and the 
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need to step up the production of military equipment. On the other hand, both interstate and civil wars 
disrupt non-military production, which could increase unemployment. In one robustness check, we 
additionally control for the impact of ethnic tensions. In a previous paper, we report that ethnic 
fractionalization increased unemployment in a large sample of industrial and developing countries, 
suggesting that this may be because fractionalization reduces labor market efficiency (Feldmann 
2012c). 
 
In another check, we additionally control for the impact of product market regulation. Theoretical 
studies argue that anticompetitive product market regulations (e.g., entry restrictions, price controls) 
will generally reduce equilibrium output and labor demand, increasing unemployment (e.g., 
Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003; Pissarides 2003). Indeed, several empirical studies find evidence for 
such an adverse labor market effect (e.g., Bassanini and Duval 2006, Feldmann 2012d). 
 
In a further robustness check, we additionally control for the impact of legal restrictions on both 
international trade and international capital movements. Fewer restrictions of international trade can 
have the same opposing effects as trade openness.5 On the one hand, they may increase the efficiency 
of cross-country labor allocation, reducing unemployment. On the other hand, they may trigger job 
losses due to increased import competition. Fewer restrictions of cross-border financial transactions 
are likely to improve the efficient allocation of resources and attract FDI inflows, reducing 
unemployment. However, they may also lead to erratic capital movements such as speculative in- and 
outflows or sudden stops, increasing unemployment. 
 
In another robustness check, we additionally control for the impact of FDI, both net inflows and net 
outflows. Whereas net inflows are generally expected to reduce unemployment, net outflows can have 
either a positive or a negative effect (e.g., Blomström et al. 1997, Lipsey et al. 2010). 
 
In a final robustness check, we additionally use two demography variables, measuring the share of 
young and old people in the population, respectively. These shares vary widely in our sample. A high 
share of either young or old people may increase unemployment because both groups usually have 
more difficulties finding a job. 
 
                                                 
5 Although ‘openness’ and ‘regulation of international trade’ are negatively correlated (-0.53), the absolute value of the 
correlation coefficient is not high, indicating that they capture different aspects of international trade. 
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The variables exclusively used in some robustness checks are not included in the baseline 
specification either because doing so would markedly reduce the number of countries and 
observations or because they are not normally considered in cross-country unemployment 
regressions. 
 
In several supplementary regressions, we explore possible channels through which banking system 
concentration may affect unemployment. In two of these, we additionally include ‘net interest margin’ 
and ‘bank overhead costs’, respectively. As some previous studies indicate that bank concentration 
affects the cost of financial intermediation, the intention here is to check whether bank concentration 
affects unemployment through this transmission channel. 
 
 
4.  Dependent variable, sample and methodology 
 
Most of our unemployment data are from the ILO’s (2009) Key Indicators of the Labour Market. 
They are based on labor force surveys and thus do not refer to registered unemployment. Instead they 
are based on an international standard that defines the unemployed as all persons above a specific age 
who, during the reference period, were without work, currently available for work and seeking work. 
Although national coverage of unemployment can vary with regard to factors such as age limits and 
criteria for seeking work, the ILO has undertaken great efforts to produce series that are comparable 
across countries. With regard to age limits, for example, almost all national series presented in this 
publication refer to the age group 15 years and older. Furthermore, the ILO has ‘cleaned’ all national 
time series to eliminate breaks in series. Thus these data are comparable over time. Although the 
ILO’s unemployment data are not completely harmonized across countries, they are harmonized to a 
large extent. 
 
Our sample consists of 42 developing countries (Appendix). Developing countries are defined as low 
and middle income countries according to World Bank classification. We use annual data from 1987 
to 2007. Data for more countries and years are unavailable for some of our variables. For example, 
data on ‘bank concentration’ are available only from the late 1980s onwards. In general, with respect 
to both countries and years the sample size is determined by data availability only. 
 
We run two-stage least squares regressions of the following form: 
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Second stage: 
 1                     𝑈𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                
First stage: 
 2                    𝐵𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽3 𝐵𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 −  𝐵𝑖 ,𝑡−𝑠−1  + 𝛽4𝑿𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜅𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 ,𝑡
2
𝑠=1
                                             
 
Ui,t is the unemployment rate of country i at year t, B denotes the ‘bank concentration’ variable and 
X is a vector of our control variables. Country fixed effects in the second- and first-stage regressions 
are αi and γi, respectively. Year fixed effects are λt and 𝜅t, respectively, while the error terms are εi,t 
and ηi,t, respectively. While country fixed effects are included to control for the impact of unobserved 
country-specific characteristics, year effects are included to control for the impact of shocks that are 
common across countries. 
 
We instrument our ‘bank concentration’ variable to extract its exogenous component. The 
instruments are lagged differences of the instrumented variable covering the previous three years. 
Lagged differences of the instrumented variable have been shown to be valid instruments, provided 
they pass a test for over-identifying restrictions and are sufficiently strong.6 To test for over-
identifying restrictions, we use Hansen’s (1982) J test. We also report the first-stage F statistic 
because Staiger and Stock (1997) proposed the rule of thumb that this statistic should take on a value 
of at least ten; otherwise the instruments are weak. According to the results from Hansen’s J test and 
the first-stage F statistic, our instruments are both exogenous and relevant, and thus valid (Tables 2 
and 3). 
 
To check whether random effects yield similar point estimates, we perform a further robustness check 
using random rather than fixed country effects. Random effects estimates have the advantage of 
exploiting both the cross-country and the time-series variation within the sample. By contrast, fixed 
effects estimates only use the time-series variation. We do not use the random effects estimator in our 
baseline specification because only “conventional” standard errors are available for this estimator in 
two-stage least-squares panel data estimation. Thus, in contrast to our fixed effects regressions, the 
standard errors from our random effects regressions are neither robust nor adjusted for clusters at the 
country level. 
 
                                                 
6 This insight comes from, inter alia, research into GMM estimation (Arellano and Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998). 
The latter is not an option in our case because it requires the number of cross sections to be much larger than the number 
of time periods as otherwise the estimates can be severely biased and imprecise (Roodman 2009a, 2009b). Thus we follow 
Roodman’s (2009b) advice to use a fixed effects estimator instead. 
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Our two-stage least squares methodology has the crucial advantage of tackling potential endogeneity 
of our variable of interest. Thus our estimates establish the causal effect of bank concentration on 
unemployment. Note, however, that this methodology does not enable us to simultaneously account 
for potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables, some of which, such as inflation rate, real 
interest rate and output gap, are clearly endogenous.7 
 
 
5.  Results 
 
Table 2 presents our main results. While column 1 reports the results from our baseline regression, 
the other columns report the results from our robustness checks. The coefficient on ‘bank 
concentration’ is statistically significant in each regression. According to our estimates, higher 
banking system concentration increases the unemployment rate. In all robustness checks except one, 
the size of the coefficient is similar to the estimate from the baseline regression. In regression 5 it is 
somewhat higher. 
 
Our results suggest that, over our sample period, the effect of banking system concentration on 
unemployment was substantial. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the ‘bank 
concentration’ variable is associated with an increase in the unemployment rate of between 1.3 and 
1.5 percentage points, ceteris paribus. These figures are based on, respectively, the smallest and the 
largest coefficient on ‘bank concentration’ from the regressions presented in Table 2. 
 
Comparing two countries also suggests that differences in banking system concentration might have 
had a substantial impact on unemployment. For example, over our sample period Pakistan had both 
a relatively low level of bank concentration and a relatively low unemployment rate whereas in the 
Philippines both bank concentration and unemployment were much higher. Specifically, the share of 
the three largest banks averaged 60% in Pakistan and 79% in the Philippines, while the average 
unemployment rate was 6.4% in the former and 9.7% in the latter country. According to our estimates, 
if bank concentration in the Philippines had been as low as in Pakistan, the Philippines’ 
unemployment rate might have been between 1.4 and 1.7 percentage points lower, ceteris paribus. 
These figures, too, are calculated using the smallest and the largest coefficient on ‘bank 
concentration’ from the regressions presented in Table 2. Of course, they (as the ones in the previous 
                                                 
7 A commonly used methodology to simultaneously tackle endogeneity of all explanatory variables is GMM. However, 
as mentioned in the previous footnote, this methodology is not applicable here because our dataset does not meet the 
GMM requirement of large N, small T. 
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paragraph) should be taken with a pinch of salt. Still, they illustrate that the magnitude of the effect 
is likely to have been substantial. 
 
Table 3 presents the results from our supplementary regressions, which are intended to provide 
evidence on the channels through which banking system concentration might affect unemployment. 
– In the first regression, we exclude ‘bank credit’ because bank concentration might affect 
unemployment by affecting credit availability. We include ‘bank deposits’ instead in order to 
control for the size of the banking sector. In this regression, the point estimate for the coefficient 
on ‘bank concentration’ is marginally higher than in the baseline regression (Table 2). This 
provides some tentative evidence that higher bank concentration might increase unemployment 
by reducing the availability of credit. 
– In the second supplementary regression, we exclude ‘systemic banking crises’. Again, the point 
estimate for ‘bank concentration’ is marginally higher than in the baseline regression, tentatively 
indicating that the adverse effect of banking system concentration on unemployment might partly 
run through systemic banking crises. 
– In the third supplementary regression, we drop both ‘bank credit’ and ‘systemic banking crises’.8 
In this case, the increase in the point estimate for ‘bank concentration’ is slightly higher than in 
the previous two regressions. Combined with the results from these regressions, and with the fact 
that ‘bank credit’ has a favorable and ‘systemic banking crises’ an adverse effect when included 
in the regression analysis (Tables 2 and 3), this indicates that bank concentration might affect 
unemployment through both channels. 
– In the fourth supplementary regression, we add ‘net interest margin’. Compared with the baseline 
specification, the point estimate for ‘bank concentration’ is now both lower in size and less 
statistically significant. This suggests that banking system concentration might increase 
unemployment by raising net interest margins. However, the coefficient on ‘net interest margin’ 
is statistically insignificant, which undermines the case for higher interest margins increasing 
unemployment. 
– In our final supplementary regression, we add ‘bank overhead costs’. The coefficient on this 
variable is statistically significant and has a positive algebraic sign. Also, the point estimate for 
‘bank concentration’ is slightly lower than in the baseline specification. This suggests that bank 
concentration might increase unemployment via higher intermediation costs. 
 
                                                 
8 As in the first supplementary regression, we add ‘bank deposits’ to control for the size of the banking industry.  
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Taken together, our supplementary regressions provide some evidence on the channels through which 
banking system concentration might increase unemployment. However, the evidence is fragmentary 
and weak, not least because the changes in the point estimates for the coefficient on ‘bank 
concentration’, compared with the baseline regression, are small. The channels through which 
banking system concentration affects unemployment need to be studied in more detail in future 
research. 
 
Although the transmission channels through which banking system concentration affects 
unemployment still need to be more thoroughly explored, we can conclude that our results are in line 
with previous research according to which bank concentration adversely affects credit availability, 
banking crises and the cost of financial intermediation (section 2). They also accord with previous 
empirical research showing that higher concentration hampers start-up activity as well as growth of 
firms and industries, and increases the chances of bank failures. As explained in section 2, each of 
these effects, too, is likely to have adverse knock-on effects on unemployment. As far as theory is 
concerned, our results corroborate the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis. 
 
Note that, although the results from previous empirical studies are mixed overall, most of the previous 
research covering developing countries suggests that, in these countries, banking system 
concentration has adverse effects at least on the cost of financial intermediation and credit availability. 
Of course, our paper is also in line with our companion paper studying the labor market effects of 
bank concentration in industrial countries. Interestingly, the magnitude of the unemployment effect 
appears to be slightly larger in developing countries. This might be due to the fact that capital markets 
– particularly, markets for shares, corporate bonds and venture capital – are much less developed in 
these countries. As most firms there do not have access to these alternative sources of funding, they 
depend relatively more on bank loans. This in turn is likely to magnify the adverse effect of bank 
concentration on unemployment. Furthermore, the unemployment effect of bank concentration in 
developing countries might be larger than in industrial countries because the former have both higher 
concentration ratios and higher risks of bank failure and banking crises (Evrensel 2008). 
 
Finally, a brief comment on the results for the control variables (Tables 2 and 3). We find that more 
centralized collective bargaining is associated with lower unemployment. A possible explanation is 
that very centralized bargaining systems lead to wage moderation if they induce unions to internalize 
the detrimental effects of excessive wage hikes (Bruno and Sachs 1985). Several studies covering 
industrial countries also find higher centralization to be correlated with lower unemployment (e.g., 
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Di Tella and MacCulloch 2005, Feldmann 2011). Also in line with the previous literature, we find 
some, albeit non-robust, evidence that more generous unemployment benefits may raise, and that 
higher inflation may reduce, unemployment. As usual, we find robust evidence that the business cycle 
strongly affects unemployment. Furthermore, we find robust evidence that higher GDP per capita is 
associated with lower unemployment, suggesting that richer developing countries may be better able 
to integrate workers into the job market. Although non-robust, the coefficient on ‘openness’ suggests 
that developing countries that are more open to international trade have lower unemployment rates, 
perhaps because of more job opportunities in export industries. Conversely, higher FDI outflows are 
associated with more unemployment, probably because they reduce the number of jobs in 
internationally mobile firms. Finally, stricter regulation of cross-border capital flows is correlated 
with less unemployment, perhaps because it avoids the disruptive effects erratic capital movements 
and sudden stops can have on the labor market. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Our regression results suggest that a more concentrated banking sector is likely to increase 
unemployment in developing countries. The magnitude of the effect appears to be substantial. Our 
results are robust to both endogeneity of ‘bank concentration’ and numerous variations in 
specification. 
 
Although our results are both robust and in line with many previous papers – particularly, with our 
companion paper covering industrial countries – more research is clearly warranted, both theoretical 
and empirical. Most importantly, as noted in the previous section, the transmission channels from 
banking system concentration to unemployment need to be more closely analyzed. Furthermore, 
future cross-country studies should use alternative measures of concentration and larger samples of 
countries. Case studies of individual countries closely tracking the evolution of bank concentration, 
labor market performance and the links between the two would also be welcome. 
 
The results reported in this paper have potentially important implications for policy-making – 
particularly because many developing countries have high levels of both bank concentration and 
unemployment. The most appropriate policy measures vary from country to country, according to the 
degree, specific characteristics and historical roots of bank concentration, as well as according to the 
intensity and other characteristics of competition in the respective national banking industry. The 
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most important policy measures are likely to include lowering entry barriers, especially for foreign 
banks and domestic non-bank financial intermediaries; imposing stricter limits on mergers that would 
create or enhance a dominant market position; introducing a sliding scale of capital adequacy ratios 
that rise with the size of the banks; and privatizing large state-owned banks, which is important 
because state-owned banks play a dominant role in many developing countries. 
 
 
Appendix. List of countries 
 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, 
Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe. 
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Table 1. List of variables 
 
 Definition Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Source 
Bank 
concentration 
The assets of the three largest banks as a decimal fraction of total banking system assets (excluding the 
central bank). 
0.57 0.17 0.20 1.00 Beck et al. 
(2012) 
Bank credit The value of deposit money bank credit to the private sector as a decimal fraction of GDP. Deposit money 
banks comprise all financial institutions (excluding the central bank) that have liabilities in the form of 
deposits usable in making payments. 
0.40 0.31 0.00 1.66 Beck et al. 
(2012) 
Bank deposits Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks as a decimal fraction of GDP. Deposit money 
banks comprise all financial institutions (excluding the central bank) that have liabilities in the form of 
deposits usable in making payments. 
0.39 0.25 0.00 1.20 Beck et al. 
(2012) 
Bank overhead 
costs 
Accounting value of a bank’s overhead costs as a decimal fraction of its total assets. 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.30 Beck et al. 
(2012) 
Centralized 
collective 
bargaining 
Subindex ‘centralized collective bargaining’ of the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index, scaled to 
take values between 0 (least centralized) and 1 (most centralized). Because prior to 2000 the EFW index is 
available on a five year basis only, the author of this paper filled the gaps by linear interpolation. 
0.32 0.12 0.11 0.71 Gwartney and 
Lawson 
(2009), 
author’s 
calculations 
Credit market 
regulation 
Chain-linked subindex ‘credit market regulations’ of the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index, 
scaled to take values between 0 (least restrictive) and 1 (most restrictive). The subindex covers the 
following aspects: percentage of bank deposits held in privately owned banks, percentage of foreign banks’ 
license applications denied, foreign bank assets as a percentage of total banking sector assets, percentage of 
domestic credit consumed by the private sector, extent of interest rate controls, and prevalence of negative 
real deposit and lending rates. Because prior to 2000 the EFW index is available on a five year basis only, 
the author of this paper filled the gaps by linear interpolation. 
0.29 0.14 0.00 0.92 Gwartney and 
Lawson 
(2009), 
author’s 
calculations 
Employment 
protection 
legislation 
Indicator of the stringency of employment protection legislation. Regular contracts of unspecified duration 
after any trial period for the job. Unweighted average of measures for advance notice period and for 
severance payment, each of which in turn is based on averages across three lengths of service: after 9 
months, after 4 years, and after 20 years. Scores ranging from 0 (least restrictive) to 1 (most restrictive). 
0.41 0.15 0.00 0.75 Aleksynska 
and Schindler 
(2011), 
author’s 
calculations 
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Table 1. List of variables (cont.) 
 
 Definition Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Source 
Ethnic tensions Component ‘ethnic tensions’ of the International Country Risk Guide, indicating the degree of tension 
within a country attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions. The rating scale ranges from 0 to 
1. Higher ratings are given to countries where racial and nationality tensions are high because opposing 
groups are intolerant and unwilling to compromise. Lower ratings are given to countries where tensions are 
minimal, even though such differences may still exist. 
0.28 0.21 0.00 0.83 PRS Group 
(2009), 
author’s 
calculations 
FDI net inflows Foreign direct investment net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) as a decimal fraction of 
GDP. 
0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.31 World Bank 
(2010) 
FDI net outflows Foreign direct investment net outflows as a decimal fraction of GDP. 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.17 World Bank 
(2010) 
GDP per capita Gross domestic product per capita, in tens of thousands of constant 2005 international dollars, converted at 
purchasing power parity rates. 
0.81 0.44 0.02 2.04 World Bank 
(2010) 
Income & payroll 
tax rate 
Subindex ‘top marginal tax rate’ of the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index. It is scaled to take 
values between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating higher marginal income and payroll tax rates and 
lower income thresholds at which the top marginal income tax rates apply. Because prior to 2000 the EFW 
index is available on a five year basis only, the author of this paper filled the gaps by linear interpolation. 
0.41 0.18 0.00 1.00 Gwartney and 
Lawson 
(2009), 
author’s 
calculations 
Inflation rate Annual change in the consumer price index; decimal fraction. 0.11 0.21 -0.01 2.82 IMF (2010), 
World Bank 
(2010) 
Minimum wage Statutory minimum wage as a decimal fraction of the mean wage. 0.38 0.19 0.00 0.87 Aleksynska 
and Schindler 
(2011) 
Net interest 
margin 
Accounting value of a bank’s net interest revenue as a decimal fraction of its interest-bearing (total earning) 
assets. 
0.04 0.03 -0.09 0.23 Beck et al. 
(2012) 
Openness Ratio of exports and imports of goods and services to GDP. 0.77 0.40 0.16 2.20 World Bank 
(2010) 
Output gap The difference between actual and potential GDP as a decimal fraction of potential GDP. Potential GDP is 
estimated by calculating the trend component of GDP. The latter is obtained by using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter (λ = 6.25). 
-0.00 0.02 -0.12 0.07 World Bank 
(2010), 
author’s 
calculations 
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Table 1. List of variables (cont.) 
 
 Definition Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Source 
Population aged 0-
14 
Population between the ages 0 to 14 years as a decimal fraction of the total population. 0.27 0.08 0.13 0.43 World Bank 
(2010) 
Population aged 
65+ 
Population aged 65 years and older as a decimal fraction of the total population. 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.17 World Bank 
(2010) 
Product market 
regulation 
Index of regulatory impediments to product market competition. The index is scaled to take values between 
0 and 1, with higher values indicating stricter regulation. It covers the following three equally weighted 
sectors: agriculture, electricity, and telecommunications. 
0.52 0.25 0.06 1.00 Ostry et al. 
(2009), 
author’s 
calculations 
Real interest rate The lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator; decimal fraction. 0.09 0.18 -0.35 2.52 World Bank 
(2010) 
Regulation of 
capital account 
transactions 
Index measuring the intensity of legal restrictions on residents’ and nonresidents’ ability to move capital 
into and out of a country. The index is scaled to take values between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating 
tighter restrictions. 
0.32 0.24 0.00 0.88 Ostry et al. 
(2009), 
author’s 
calculations 
Regulation of 
international trade 
Chain-linked subindex ‘freedom to trade internationally’ of the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) 
index, scaled to take values between 0 (least restrictive) and 1 (most restrictive). The subindex covers the 
following aspects: taxes on international trade, regulatory trade barriers, actual relative to expected size of 
the trade sector, black-market exchange rates, and international capital market controls. Because prior to 
2000 the EFW index is available on a five year basis only, the author of this paper filled the gaps by linear 
interpolation. 
0.30 0.08 0.10 0.63 Gwartney and 
Lawson 
(2009), 
author’s 
calculations 
Stock market 
activity 
The value of shares traded on domestic stock exchanges as a decimal fraction of GDP. 0.15 0.24 0.00 1.81 Beck et al. 
(2012) 
Systemic banking 
crises 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if, in the respective year, the country experienced a systemic 
banking crisis. A banking crisis is considered to be systemic if two conditions are met: first, significant 
signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the 
banking system, and bank liquidations); and second, significant banking policy intervention measures in 
response to significant losses in the banking system. 
0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 Laeven and 
Valencia 
(2008, 2010) 
Unemployment 
benefits 
replacement rate 
Gross unemployment benefits as a decimal fraction of previous gross wage earnings; average for the first 
two years of unemployment. 
0.10 0.11 0.00 0.57 Aleksynska 
and Schindler 
(2011) 
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Table 1. List of variables (cont.) 
 
 Definition Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Source 
Unemployment 
rate 
Unemployed as a percentage of the labor force. Labor force survey data. 9.07 4.73 0.90 28.85 European 
Commission 
(2009), ILO 
(2009), IMF 
(2010), OECD 
(2010) 
War Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if, in the respective year, there was a war on the country’s territory. 
The variable takes both wars between two or more states and internal wars (with or without intervention 
from other states) into account. 
0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 Centre for the 
Study of Civil 
Wars (2009) 
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Table 2. Main regressions to explain the unemployment ratea) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Baseline 
specification 
Random 
effects 
substituted for 
fixed effectsb) 
Stock market 
activity added 
Product 
market 
regulation 
added 
Regulation of 
international 
trade and 
capital 
account 
transactions 
added 
Foreign direct 
investment 
added 
Ethnic 
tensions 
added 
Demography 
added 
Bank concentration 7.85** 
(3.60) 
7.30*** 
(2.54) 
7.66** 
(3.66) 
7.58** 
(3.58) 
9.09** 
(4.19) 
8.14** 
(4.14) 
7.46** 
(3.61) 
7.65** 
(3.71) 
Bank credit -3.44** 
(1.54) 
-4.02*** 
(0.94) 
-3.28** 
(1.53) 
-3.36** 
(1.39) 
-3.11* 
(1.82) 
-4.14** 
(1.74) 
-3.40** 
(1.44) 
-3.93** 
(1.79) 
Credit market regulation -5.21 
(3.28) 
-4.54*** 
(1.62) 
-6.77** 
(3.33) 
-4.05 
(2.93) 
-5.69* 
(3.20) 
-5.58 
(3.45) 
-4.48 
(3.50) 
-4.22 
(3.24) 
Systemic banking crises 0.94** 
(0.41) 
0.96*** 
(0.34) 
0.96** 
(0.46) 
1.01** 
(0.41) 
1.06** 
(0.43) 
0.90 
(0.56) 
0.96** 
(0.39) 
0.93** 
(0.40) 
Centralized collective 
bargaining 
-4.21* 
(2.27) 
-3.33** 
(1.49) 
-4.80* 
(2.56) 
-5.58*** 
(2.09) 
-2.35 
(2.70) 
-3.16 
(2.31) 
-4.29* 
(2.30) 
-4.56* 
(2.35) 
Minimum wage 1.80 
(1.79) 
1.25 
(1.20) 
2.88* 
(1.59) 
0.94 
(1.89) 
-0.15 
(1.86) 
1.85 
(1.52) 
0.90 
(1.97) 
2.64 
(1.70) 
Employment protection 
legislation 
0.18 
(2.55) 
1.22 
(1.65) 
0.67 
(2.52) 
-1.08 
(2.23) 
-0.32 
(2.29) 
0.88 
(2.94) 
0.16 
(2.48) 
0.50 
(2.90) 
Unemployment benefits 
replacement rate 
8.18 
(5.44) 
10.42*** 
(3.18) 
8.57 
(5.45) 
10.10* 
(5.76) 
5.85 
(4.87) 
9.66 
(6.08) 
7.87 
(5.70) 
6.00 
(5.56) 
Income & payroll tax rate -1.43 
(1.62) 
-1.07 
(1.13) 
-1.44 
(1.69) 
-0.71 
(1.57) 
-0.55 
(1.65) 
-2.43 
(1.83) 
-1.22 
(1.56) 
-0.86 
(1.69) 
Real interest rate 0.45 
(0.90) 
0.69 
(0.87) 
0.33 
(0.91) 
0.26 
(0.88) 
0.66 
(1.08) 
0.27 
(1.32) 
0.68 
(0.90) 
0.58 
(0.94) 
Inflation rate -1.24* 
(0.73) 
-1.31* 
(0.72) 
-1.05 
(0.74) 
-1.40** 
(0.69) 
-1.17* 
(0.66) 
-1.16 
(0.82) 
-1.47* 
(0.76) 
-1.04 
(0.74) 
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Table 2. Main regressions to explain the unemployment ratea) (cont.) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Baseline 
specification 
Random 
effects 
substituted for 
fixed effectsb) 
Stock market 
activity added 
Product 
market 
regulation 
added 
Regulation of 
international 
trade and 
capital 
account 
transactions 
added 
Foreign direct 
investment 
added 
Ethnic 
tensions 
added 
Demography 
added 
Openness -2.68* 
(1.49) 
-2.93*** 
(0.95) 
-2.08 
(1.51) 
-2.45* 
(1.42) 
-1.05 
(1.58) 
-2.69* 
(1.47) 
-2.82* 
(1.52) 
-2.73* 
(1.45) 
Output gap -23.44*** 
(4.41) 
-27.60*** 
(5.05) 
-20.49*** 
(4.30) 
-21.97*** 
(4.29) 
-22.98*** 
(4.19) 
-25.09*** 
(4.34) 
-23.81*** 
(4.32) 
-22.15*** 
(4.68) 
GDP per capita -6.52** 
(2.55) 
-3.51*** 
(1.05) 
-7.28*** 
(2.52) 
-7.04** 
(2.92) 
-9.98*** 
(2.34) 
-6.16** 
(2.54) 
-6.34** 
(2.57) 
-7.34*** 
(2.80) 
War -0.19 
(0.72) 
-0.23 
(0.54) 
-0.31 
(0.69) 
-0.38 
(0.76) 
-0.15 
(0.86) 
-0.11 
(0.74) 
-0.17 
(0.70) 
-0.23 
(0.76) 
Stock market activity   -0.11 
(0.54) 
     
Product market regulation    -3.15** 
(1.52) 
    
Regulation of international 
trade 
    2.28 
(3.36) 
   
Regulation of capital account 
transactions 
    -3.59*** 
(1.09) 
   
FDI net inflows      -3.40 
(7.74) 
  
FDI net outflows      26.26*** 
(8.03) 
  
Ethnic tensions       0.70 
(1.61) 
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Table 2. Main regressions to explain the unemployment ratea) (cont.) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Baseline 
specification 
Random 
effects 
substituted for 
fixed effectsb) 
Stock market 
activity added 
Product 
market 
regulation 
added 
Regulation of 
international 
trade and 
capital 
account 
transactions 
added 
Foreign direct 
investment 
added 
Ethnic 
tensions 
added 
Demography 
added 
Population aged 0-14        -26.47 
(47.83) 
Population aged 65+        75.69 
(95.80) 
Number of observations 350 351 333 310 325 305 345 350 
Number of countries 41 42 38 38 41 36 40 41 
R2 within 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.48 0.48 0.56 0.53 0.52 
F statistic 510.07***  83.22*** 957.07*** 77.98*** 19,990.19*** 1,029.07*** 1,241.63*** 
Standard error of regression 1.38  1.37 1.35 1.35 1.37 1.37 1.37 
Hansen J statistic (p value) 0.20  0.12 0.29 0.29 0.15 0.13 0.16 
First-stage F statistic 139.68***  740.94*** 432.38*** 179.11*** 3,439.10*** 126.29*** 930.35*** 
 
a)Two-stage least squares regressions with country-specific fixed effects, except for regression 2, which uses generalized two-stage least squares with country-specific 
random effects. ‘Bank concentration’ is instrumented; the excluded instruments are lagged differences of this variable covering the previous three years. Annual data for 
1987 to 2007. All regressions also contain year dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Except for regression 2, they are robust and adjusted for clusters at 
the country level. ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level. 
b)The χ2 statistic from the Hausman test is 13.48. The p value from the Sargan statistic is 0.37. The Wald χ2 statistic is 293.11***. The Wald χ2 statistic from the first-stage 
regression is 163.93***. 
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Table 3. Supplementary regressions to explain the unemployment ratea) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bank deposits 
substituted for 
bank credit 
Systemic 
banking crises 
excluded 
Bank deposits 
substituted for 
bank credit and 
systemic 
banking crises 
excluded 
Net interest 
margin added 
Bank overhead 
costs added 
Bank concentration 8.21** 
(3.88) 
8.06** 
(3.72) 
8.35** 
(3.96) 
6.43* 
(3.33) 
7.07** 
(3.22) 
Bank credit  -2.55* 
(1.53) 
 -3.55** 
(1.75) 
-3.24* 
(1.95) 
Credit market regulation -5.68* 
(3.15) 
-4.83 
(3.22) 
-5.30* 
(3.04) 
-2.47 
(2.88) 
-3.71 
(3.03) 
Systemic banking crises 0.64* 
(0.38) 
  1.02** 
(0.41) 
0.97** 
(0.46) 
Centralized collective 
bargaining 
-3.62 
(2.26) 
-4.33* 
(2.28) 
-3.78* 
(2.25) 
-5.42*** 
(1.94) 
-5.43*** 
(1.79) 
Minimum wage 1.20 
(1.90) 
1.56 
(1.88) 
1.13 
(1.95) 
2.50 
(1.85) 
2.77 
(1.89) 
Employment protection 
legislation 
0.24 
(2.72) 
0.26 
(2.47) 
0.29 
(2.64) 
0.52 
(2.34) 
1.25 
(2.20) 
Unemployment benefits 
replacement rate 
10.67** 
(5.40) 
8.07 
(5.73) 
10.18* 
(5.62) 
10.47** 
(5.27) 
10.46** 
(5.22) 
Income & payroll tax rate -0.94 
(1.94) 
-1.55 
(1.64) 
-1.17 
(1.93) 
-1.35 
(1.46) 
-1.37 
(1.37) 
Real interest rate 0.50 
(0.98) 
-0.05 
(0.95) 
0.18 
(1.08) 
0.48 
(1.10) 
-1.95 
(2.97) 
Inflation rate -1.27 
(0.80) 
-1.20 
(0.79) 
-1.21 
(0.84) 
-1.22 
(0.93) 
-3.36 
(2.04) 
Openness -1.64 
(1.48) 
-2.29 
(1.59) 
-1.50 
(1.48) 
-1.94 
(1.49) 
-1.91 
(1.47) 
Output gap -24.09*** 
(4.60) 
-26.73*** 
(5.02) 
-26.55*** 
(5.04) 
-23.85*** 
(4.38) 
-24.14*** 
(4.76) 
GDP per capita -7.76*** 
(2.33) 
-6.78*** 
(2.39) 
-7.63*** 
(2.31) 
-5.01* 
(2.59) 
-5.18** 
(2.30) 
War -0.30 
(0.68) 
-0.22 
(0.71) 
-0.32 
(0.67) 
-0.41 
(0.63) 
-0.23 
(0.72) 
Bank deposits -3.23 
(3.17) 
 -2.94 
(3.27) 
  
Net interest margin    0.55 
(5.90) 
 
Bank overhead costs     22.88*** 
(7.99) 
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Table 3. Supplementary regressions to explain the unemployment ratea) (cont.) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bank deposits 
substituted for 
bank credit 
Systemic 
banking crises 
excluded 
Bank deposits 
substituted for 
bank credit and 
systemic 
banking crises 
excluded 
Net interest 
margin added 
Bank overhead 
costs added 
Number of observations 350 350 350 340 337 
Number of countries 41 41 41 41 40 
R2 within 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.54 
F statistic 189.12*** 76.99*** 91.58*** 360.39*** 278.94*** 
Standard error of regression 1.41 1.40 1.42 1.33 1.31 
Hansen J statistic (p value) 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.24 0.23 
First-stage F statistic 90.51*** 126.99*** 83.15*** 533.82*** 205.35*** 
 
a)Two-stage least squares regressions with country-specific fixed effects. ‘Bank concentration’ is instrumented; the 
excluded instruments are lagged differences of this variable covering the previous three years. Annual data for 1987 to 
2007. All regressions also contain year dummies. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clusters at the country level, are 
reported in parentheses. ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level. 
 
